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Introduction
 There are core but curious differences between the novel Planet of the 
Apes (1963) (originally La planète des singes (1963)) and its movie version, 
Planet of the Apes (1968). These differences arise fundamentally from the 
fact that the laws of translation in the universe in which the novel is set are 
not the same as those in the universe of the movie. This is because the book, 
(hereafter La planète des singes), operates within the dictates of French 
continental philosophy whereas the movie (hereafter Planet of the Apes) is 
set in the alternate universe of Anglo-American analytic philosophy. Both 
universes are ultimately structured by how translation operates within them.
Continental Philosophy and Analytic Philosophy
 The basic difference between continental philosophy and analytical 
philosophy is that continental philosophy centers translation to be a meaning-
making mechanism whereas analytical philosophy relegates it to the role of a 
neutral and invisible meaning-explaining tool.
 In continental philosophy, translation is seen as an act that constructs 
meaning through the interpretation of texts. Translation implies plurality 
since all readings are socially and historically sited and hence capable 
of multiple variations. Meaning is not relative (since that would make 
it ‘meaningless’) but neither is it absolute (since in a world of semantic 
plurality this is impossible). By contrast, the analytical philosophical view is 
that translation does not create meaning, it merely transmits it. A text has a 
singular true interpretation and translation works by relaying faithfully and 
neutrally this interpretation. Meaning is absolute and universal, otherwise it 
would not be coherent and hence ‘meaningful’.
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 To make the same point slightly differently, the continental tradition 
emphasizes the socially embedded semantics of language that grow from 
the syntactic, whereas the analytic tradition emphasizes the universal 
logical syntax that grounds the semantic.1 In summary, for the continentals, 
philosophy is about finding the semantic in the syntactic, for the analytics, it 
is about finding the syntactic in the semantic.
 Following this, we can surmise that on the planète des singes translation 
is a conscious game played in society that results, not so consciously, in 
the creation and control of meaning, whereas on the Planet of the Apes 
translation is an invisible and neutral tool facilitating, when permitted, the 
revelation of shared and universal truths.
Planets Plots
 Both La planète des singes and Planet of the Apes tell the tale of a man 
(named Ulysse Mérou in the book, George Taylor in the movie) who travels 
into space to arrive on a planet where apes are the intelligent and dominant 
animal, and humans are mute and wild. In both stories, the hero (Mérou/
Taylor) gets captured in a hunt and held captive in a scientific research 
institute. The institute is populated by scientist apes, one of whom is a 
chimpanzee named Zira and another of whom is an orangutan named Dr. 
Zaius. It is only when Mérou/Taylor first communicates with Zira that the 
different philosophies operating in each universe, the universe of the book 
and the universe of the movie, are revealed. In La Planète Des Singes, 
translation is ever present whereas in Planet of the Apes it is ever invisible. 
And with this, and because of this, the two stories completely diverge.
When Mérou met Zira
 On the planète des singes, Mérou at first simply talks in French (which 
no ape speaks) to his capturers. He believes that this alone will prove he is 
intelligent, rational, and not like the other humans on the planet. However, 
in this universe rationality is not a given, but must be derived from the 
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successful translation of oneself into the prevailing social discourse. Mérou’s 
talking is, at first, interpreted as simple animal mimicry by the ape scientists. 
It is only when he draws a geometrical diagram on the ground before Zira (the 
one ape he picks out as being possibly capable of properly interpreting him) 
that he manages to communicate his rational mind. Of course, this all initially 
sounds like the analytic universe where mathematical truths are universal 
and can be translated into diagrams and symbols that can be understood by 
any rational creature. However, Mérou makes a curious comment that utterly 
undermines such a reading. He remarks upon the incident as follows:
  Mustering my school-day memories, I drew the geometrical figure 
illustrating the theorem of Pythagoras. It was not at random that I chose 
this proposition: I remembered reading in my youth a prophetic book in 
which such a procedure had been used by an old scientist to enter into 
communication with the spirits of another world. I had even discussed 
this during the voyage with Professor Antelle, who approved of the 
method. He had added, I distinctly remembered, that the Euclidean 
rules, being completely false, were no doubt for that very reason 
universal. (1963a, 121; emphasis added)
This last line, Professor Antelle’s comment that Euclidean rules are universal 
because they are completely false, in every way captures the attitude of the 
continental (that is, French philosophical) mind towards human language 
and translation: “…que les règles d’Euclide, étant complètement fausses, 
devaient, à cause de cela, être universelles” (1963b, 88; emphasis added). 
This is the oft expressed anti-essentialist, post-metaphysical, and post-
modern condition of continental philosophy where there are no eternal truths, 
only constant, consistent, and coherent misunderstanding. We translate the 
world through our fictional but meaningful mis-presentations of it.2
 This vision of translation as meaning creation through the manipulation of 
contingent fictions is further described as the dialogic inter-specie connection 
between Mérou and Zira blossoms.
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  We were then speaking French, for, as I have said, she was quicker to 
learn my language than I hers. At the outset there were some difficulties 
of interpretation, the words “man” and “ape” not evoking the same 
creatures for us; but this snag was quickly smoothed out. Each time 
she said “ape,” I mentally translated “superior being, the height of 
evolution.” When she spoke about men, I knew she meant bestial 
creatures endowed with a certain sense of imitation and presenting a few 
anatomical similarities to apes but of an embryonic psyche and devoid 
of the power of thought. (1963a, 126)
Here we see how communication is only possible through constant 
‘translation’ which is not just a linguistic issue but a discursive one, in 
the broad sense of the term, that is, in the idea that the same words have 
completely different conceptual outcomes depending on the wider épistème 
in which the users of these words are embedded.
 These scenes of respectful, open, and pluralist dialog between Zira and 
Mérou may suggest to us that the ability to translate is the simple and 
irrefutable yardstick of mutual inter-specie intelligence. However, the 
planète des singes is the universe of continental philosophy where success 
and failure in translation depends as much on social power as linguistic 
comprehension. With Zira, a rive gauche chimpanzee, translation works 
because she is compassionate and tolerant, and, indeed, a maverick social 
dissident. However, to demonstrate his intelligence to the wider society, to 
the énarques orangutans, Mérou needs to, through disruptive rhetoric, create 
the prior space of discursive power that will allow for the énoncé of his 
personhood which must precipitate any interpreting of his self-ennunciation. 
L’interpretation avant l’interpellation, as one might say. Mérou has learned 
the ape language but this is not enough. He must also learn the language game, 
to say what is appropriate, and simply not what is evidently true. Saying “I 
can talk” does not demonstrate that you can talk. You must say it with socially 
appropriate ‘meaning’. Thus one of the most dramatic episodes in the novel is 
when Mérou, with Zira (and her fiancé Cornelius’s) encouragement, appears 
before a public forum and declares himself, in the language of the apes, to 
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be a talking and thinking animal. He has to contend with Dr. Zaius, who still 
believes him to be a mimicking animal and hence untranslatable. His speech 
could still lead to rejection. But, in the end, he does succeed and wins his 
freedom. (After the forum he is told, “There were some who opposed it…
but public opinion demanded it and they had to yield” (1963a, 179–180). The 
planète des singes is our modern liberal democracy where marginalization 
and the refusal to see the full personhood of the other derives mostly from 
conformist discourse rather than explicit and intentional repression.
When Taylor met Zira
 The American analytic Planet of the Apes exists in a universe where 
translation is such a transparent and neutral act that it is effectively invisible. 
When Taylor arrives he is shocked to find the planet run by apes but is not 
at all shocked, of course, to find that they all speak English. In this universe, 
truth is universal and spoken about in one language that all rational beings 
can equally access.
 Taylor’s difficulty in being understood, at first, derives from the fact that 
he physically cannot talk, having been shot in the throat during the hunt. 
It is only when he is cured and able to talk again that he can utter, without 
translation, the delightful words of humanity’s first inter-planetary and inter-
specie greeting: “Take your stinking paws off me, you damn dirty ape!” 
However, this act of talking does not render Taylor free. It is true that in a 
world without translation, there can be no misunderstandings. That Taylor 
can speak cannot be refuted. And this does lead to a problem with the plot, 
in that a society of rational apes must now behave irrationally and ignore 
the evidence before their eyes.3 The plot is sustained, however, by showing 
the apes (more explicitly Dr. Zaius and other orangutans) to be conscious 
and willful liars. In a closed forum (in contrast to the open forum on the 
planète des singes), Dr. Zaius and the other orangutans refuse to acknowledge 
Taylor’s obvious ability to speak, and will not recognize him as a rational 
creature. However, shortly afterwards Taylor is brought to Zaius in private 
and here Taylor confronts him about his lies.
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  Taylor: I take it you don’t believe the prosecutor’s charge, that I’m a 
monster created by Dr. Zira.
  Zaius: Certainly not. You’re a mutant.
Shortly after, Taylor says, “That hearing was a farce. What have I done?” 
To which Zaius replies “You’re a menace! A walking pestilence.” In short, 
Taylor is being rejected by ape society, not because of a failure to be 
translated (as in what almost happened on the planète des singes) but because 
his translatability demonstrates that he is an equal competitor in a them-or-
us world in which truth is unmediated and singular, and hence constantly 
endangered by the non-absorbable alterity that inhabits the threatening 
margins, which on this Planet is conveniently fenced off in a Forbidden Zone 
where “mutants” dwell.4
Papa Doll
 The analytic (American) Planet shows us a world were truth is knowable 
and determinable. Language can be universally understood to point at the 
same empirical evidence to reach the same universally agreeable rational 
conclusions. On the (French) planète, language, because of its particular and 
contingent nature needs to go through the mediation of translation which 
undermines its ability to be the final conveyor of truth. This can be seen 
in the contrasting treatment in the book and the movie of a speaking doll 
that is found at an archeological dig. The doll’s importance is the fact that 
it demonstrates the theory, postulated by the avant garde chimpanzees on 
both planets, that human civilization predates the simian one, an idea the 
orangutan scientist overseers reject as unscientific.5 Here is the section in the 
French novel where the chimp Cornellius reveals the doll to Mérou. Ulysee 
narrates:
  It is a human doll representing a little girl, a little girl like one on Earth… 
And this is not all. The toy presents another anomaly, another oddity 
that makes all the workmen laugh and even provokes a smile from the 
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solemn orangutan directing the excavations. The doll talks.…It uttered 
one word, one simple word of two syllables: pa-pa. “Papa,” the doll 
repeats as Cornelius picks it up again and turns it round and round in 
his nimble hands. The word is the same in French and in the simian 
language, and no doubt in many other languages of this mysterious 
cosmos, and it has the same meaning. (1963a, 206–207)
However, the orangutan does not interpret the doll’s ‘words’ this way, leading 
Cornelius to remark that he is a “monstrous imbecile!” To this, Mérou 
comments:
  I know whom he means and I share his indignation. The old orangutan 
with all his decorations has seen nothing more in it than a simple child 
ape’s toy that an eccentric manufacturer living in the distant past has 
endowed with speech. It is useless to suggest another explanation to 
him. (1963a, 207–208)
The sound “pa-pa” can be heard by both the chimpanzee and the orangutan. 
It is a spoken text from ancient times that has been replayed and needs 
to be translated, to be understood. In other words what it means must 
be interpreted. For Mérou and Cornelius it is the universal word in this 
“mysterious cosmos” for father. And hence demonstrates that the maker, in 
whose human image it must have been made, could speak. But this is a trendy 
new-ager interpretation. For the orangutan, the alternative interpretation is 
that the doll is merely squeaking, (and in effect this, along with the doll’s 
shape, would no more suggest that a human civilization once existed on 
this planet than the dogu figurines of ancient Japan would suggest that our 
Earth was once visited by ancient aliens). On the planète des singes, where 
translation is ever imminent, science is all about how you interpret and what 
you abduce from the evidence.6
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Mamma Doll
 The equivalent doll-finding episode on the American Planet of the Apes 
is a sharp contrast to the inter-paradigmic Kuhnian tensions described on the 
French planète des singes. The theory of early pre-simian human civilization 
is under dispute on both planets. On the American Planet of the Apes, such 
a notion contradicts the dictates of religious doctrine as expressed in the 
Sacred Scrolls which are deemed infallible truth in ape society. But in the 
case of the American Planet of the Apes, Taylor (aka Mérou), before entering 
the archeological dig where the doll will be found, is able to get Zaius (aka 
the orangutan) to openly confirm the objective standards by which scientific 
truths are to be determined.
  TAYLOR: When were the Sacred Scrolls written?
  ZAIUS: Twelve hundred years ago.
  TAYLOR: Very well. If Zira and Cornelius can prove that those 
scrolls don’t tell the whole truth of your history; if they can show you 
definite evidence of another culture from an unrecorded past—will you 
exonerate them?
  ZAIUS: Of course.
This is Popperian science at its most ideal.7 A hypothesis exists (that the 
Sacred Scrolls tell only about ancient simian civilization because that is 
the only ancient civilization that ever existed). And it can be falsified (by 
producing evidence found to show that another more ancient non-simian 
civilization existed) and an alternate hypothesis can then become proven: 
that that the Sacred Scrolls deny ancient human civilization because they 
are in error. There is no “translation” of the data into priori paradigmatic 
worldviews. The evidence is either there or it is not.
 In the cave, Zaius is at first presented with ancient artifacts that include a 
pair of spectacles and a pacemaker. However, this evidence is inconclusive 
and the falsification falters. Zaius remarks “I can give an alternate description 
for everyone of those objects that’s equally as inventive as yours. But it 
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would be conjecture, not proof.” And then the doll is produced:
  [Nova, Taylor’s human companion] is poking her finger inside the 
decapitated head of the doll. From it comes a distorted sound.
  DOLL’S HEAD: Mamma! Mamma! Mamma!
  The apes stare at the doll in astonishment. Taylor snatches the doll from 
Nova, brandishes it at the astonished Zaius.
  TAYLOR: Dr. Zaius! Would an ape make a human doll that talks?
  Zaius looks at him, speechless.
Zaius is speechless because on this planet of Popperian openness, false views 
are impossible when objective evidence is presented. The objective evidence 
is this alternate text to the Ancient Scrolls: “Mamma.” But, we must ask, 
why is this evidence “objective”? As the movie scripts dictates, and as the 
viewer can hear, the sound is “distorted.” The sound from the doll could mean 
anything, it may not even be language, just something like the squeak of a 
rubber duck. Zaius should easily refute this evidence. But he cannot because 
on this planet, translation is a neutral instrument. He can no more dispute this 
translation than one can dispute the 10cm mark on a ruler. When a doll says 
“Mamma” it can never be interpreted as anything else other than what Taylor, 
Zaius, and the viewer (supposedly) hear it to mean.
Conclusion
 Planet of the Apes, both the novel and the movie, pose the question of what 
it is to be human, what it is that makes humans different to other animals, 
and what it is that other animals would have to do to be one of us. How are 
humans different? The answer on both the French and American planets of 
the apes is, of course, translation. Humans are uniquely that animal which 
translates. Until other creatures can do the same, Earth will stay, for good or 
for ill, the Planet of the Humans.
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Notes
1  For instance, Andrew Cutrofello summarizes an important distinction between the 
continental and analytic traditions as follows: “For the phenomenologist, logic was 
just the pale distillation of the discourse in which phenomenal giveness was disclosed; 
while, for their analytic counterparts, giveness was at best another name for logically 
analyzed truth” (2005, 22).
2  In many ways, Professor Antelle represents the quintessential “ironist”, someone 
who Richard Rorty (1989) has described as one who is aware that their private truth-
describing “final vocabulary” is not the final vocabulary and that knowledge advances 
through ongoing re-descriptions of our reality where new vocabularies play off on the 
old. Euclid may be wrong but he still makes sense.
3  Bernard E. Rollin and John Huss comment on this scene with the observation that 
the orangutans have confused necessary condition for sufficient condition. To be seen 
as rational it is sufficient to be an ape using language, as whoever uses language is 
fulfilling a condition for judging rationality. But now the orangutans have made “ape” 
using language to be the necessary condition for proving rationality. Rollin likens this 
to the idea that only those who can express their pain in language can feel pain, an idea 
apparently, according to Rollin, quite common among many today in science (Rollin 
and Huss 2013).
4  See the sequel Beneath the Planet of the Apes (1970).
5  Sara Waller comments on the importance of the doll, as follows: “That talking 
doll, a toy, is of great significance, for play suggest counterfactual reasoning—
imagining the world as it is not, and interacting with things that aren’t real” (2013, 
22). This is completely true, but it is worth adding that it is the talking nature of 
the doll that demonstrates it is the product of creatures that can reason and imagine 
counterfactually, for it is possibly only language that can enable and, in turn, prove 
such abilities.
6  Translation, for Thomas Kuhn (the philosopher of science for continentals) could 
play an important role in bridging the gaps between paradigms. He comments in The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions:
  “Briefly put, what the participants in a communication breakdown do is recognize 
each other as members of a different language communities and then become 
translators…having isolated…areas of difficulty in scientific communication, 
they can next resort to their shared everyday vocabularies in an effort further to 
elucidate their troubles” (2012, 200–201). Unfortunately on the Planète des Singes 
the “imbecile” orangutans have shut down any possibilities for such cross-paradigm 
translation moves.
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7  Karl Popper in The Logic of Scientific Discovery mentions “rules of translation” in 
the falsification processes and clarifies these rules to be ways of classifying utterances 
in natural speech as being equivalent to the same event or ‘occurrence’ which is to be 
the subject of testing for falsification. Popper writes: “The purpose of these rules of 
translation is not to assert that whoever uses, in the realistic mode of speech, the word 
‘occurrence’ is thinking of a class of statements; their purpose is merely to give an 
interpretation of the realistic mode of speech which makes intelligible what is meant 
by saying, for example, that an occurance Pk contradicts a theory t” (2002, 69). What 
is going on here is the removal of translation from the realm of thinking (semantics in 
the head of a language user) to the realm of logical clarification of event descriptions.
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